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 The 'Mini-Renaissance' in Marxist Educational Sociology: a
 critique
 ROBERT WILLMOTT, University of Bath, UK
 ABSTRACT This paper argues that the recent 'mini-renaissance' in Marxist educational sociology as
 propounded in particular by Rikowski (1996, 1997) isfataly flawed, not only denying the sui generis
 (autonomous) properties of the educational system but also precluding practical social theorising per se.
 The reason for this centres on the adoption of a universal internal relations social ontology, which results
 in the reduction of concrete social reality to the narrow abstraction of the omnipresent 'Capital Relation'.
 At the same time, such theorising remains conspicuously silent on the issue of the feasible alternatives
 to capitalism implied by the (albeit flawed) explanatory critiques of such recent Marxist theorising within
 the sociology of education.
 Introduction
 The fall of the Soviet Empire signalled for the Right, especially, the theoretical and,
 moreover, practical redundancy of Marxism. 'The End of History' meant that American
 capitalism now dominated the world irrevocably. This paper does not wish to defend the
 latter nor to hammer yet another nail into the coffin of a putatively debunked corpus of
 ideas and failed socialist revolution. On the contrary, it takes as given the continuing
 relevance of radical political economy. Indeed, the explanatory utility of the distinction
 between use-value and exchange-value, and of the concepts of capital accumulation,
 labour-power and uneven development is indubitable. However, this paper proffers a
 sympathetic critique that has three modest aims. First, it aims to re-affirm the autonomy
 of the education system. Marxist educational sociology has tended to play down or
 expunge the autonomous irreducible properties of the education system. A typical (yet
 ambiguous) example delineated below is that of Dale, who tends towards an Althusserian
 'determination-in-the-last-instance' approach. Second, it takes issue with the recent
 adoption by Glenn Rikowski of the universal internal relations ontology of Bertell
 Ollman. Any adequate Marxist sociology of education must eschew this path, since one
 of the consequences of this is to withdraw autonomy from the education system. The
 rejection of the universal internal relations ontology enjoins that we respect the auton-
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 omy of the education system and pay due attention to the open nature of any social
 system. In brief, we must not reduce concrete social reality to the 'Capital Relation'.
 Third, the feasible alternatives implied by an adequate Marxist sociology of education
 are rarely, if at all, considered [1]. If Marxist educational sociology is to have practical
 import, it must (a) recognise and theorise about the multi-faceted nature of the concrete,
 and (b) make use of counterfactual analysis to proffer plausible futures.
 The Education System: to be autonomous or not to be autonomous?
 Capitalist Social Relations and the Education System: the (ambiguous) example of Dale
 Prior to Rikowski's incipient attempt to develop the rudimentary building blocks of
 'labour-power theory', the primacy accorded to capitalist social relations (be it theoreti-
 cally or practically) as subsuming the education system (and the state in general) is readily
 discernible in the Marxist literature. Thus, to Dale, for example:
 While very many social forces affect education in very important ways, the
 major motor of educational change in capitalist society is the changing nature
 of the capitalist state. Thus, while I would agree very largely with Margaret
 Archer's (1979) view of the influence of the organized teaching profession on
 education change since the war and especially over the last 20 years, neither
 the profession's rise to the peak of its influence, nor its recent fall from that
 peak can be explained by examination of its composition, its policies, its
 leadership, its size, its level of expertise or anything else internal to it. All these
 factors are necessary to explain the fonnrm that the rise and fall took, but cannot
 explain why it took place. To do that, we have to examine the changing
 demands on the State in carrying out its basic functions ... (1989, p. 45)
 Dale's criticism resonates well with Broadfoot's comment that Archer's 'elaborate model
 of educational systems might be criticised by neo-Marxists for its failure to address the
 characteristics of the over-arching capitalist order' (Broadfoot, 1996, p. 109). There is a
 tension here. For, on the one hand, Dale acknowledges the sui generis autonomy of the
 structure of the teaching profession (particularly its nature as corporate group) yet, on
 the other hand, he wants to subsume this under the 'major motor of the capitalist state'.
 He accepts the reality of other (i.e. non-capitalist) social factors that account for the
 nature of the education system at any given point in time but assumes a priori that
 capitalist factors are invariably more important. But the relative importance of non-cap-
 italist factors is an a posteriori matter. In fact, one of Archer's crucial arguments was that
 at the beginning of the 1980s, 'the single most neglected question in the vast literature
 on education concerns [prior to the 1980s] is the educational system itself ... The
 defining characteristics of a state system are in it having both political and systemic aspects'
 (cited in Broadfoot, 1996, p. 102).
 The education system possesses emergent sui generis properties, of which the centralised
 or decentralised configuration conditions agential activity in distinctive ways. Whatever
 the functional needs of capitalism (perceived or otherwise), there is no tabula rasa on
 which economic or cultural needs can be readily imprinted, modified or expunged at
 will. Crucially, any state education system qua system possesses autonomous properties
 that are irreducible to the nature of the economic system (capitalist, state socialist, market
 socialist or post-capitalist) in which it is embedded. Dale's implicit reductionism of the sui
 generis properties of the state education system to capitalist dynamics implies considerable
 degrees of freedom on the part of those fulfilling the needs of capital, yet historically this
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 is not the case. In fact, Archer does not artificially isolate the education system from the
 wider influences of the polity. She maintains that any macro-sociology of education
 involves recourse to the complex social interaction that results in particular forms of
 education, and the complex types of social and educational structures that shape the
 context in which such interaction and change occur.
 It is a complicated task because it involves separating out the factors which
 impinge upon education and those which may be ignored at any given time
 because they do not impinge upon it. It also follows that the factors which are
 included are themselves treated as unproblematic-for instance, in incorporat-
 ing the educational consequences of economic organization we do not try to
 explain the nature of the economy, but treat it as given. (Archer, 1979, p. 4)
 Thus, Archer is not denying the (obvious) importance of the economy and its organisa-
 tional implications for education. Instead, she is simply highlighting the methodological
 implications of one's substantive focus. When incorporating the impact of the economic
 recession during the 1970s, one does not need to spell out in detail its temporal
 dynamics, since this would be to detract from the substantive explanans in hand. But, of
 course, to take the economy as given is to accord autonomy to the education system as
 a prior ontological commitment. Such a commitment is a transcendental realist one,
 since any system (educational, civil service, ...) has to possess autonomous relations
 among its parts in order for it to be identified as such. However, Dale maintains that the
 largest category of staff in the education state apparatuses is teachers and that, therefore:
 no account of how education state apparatuses operate and what they can
 achieve is complete without some reference to the teaching profession. I do not
 want to go into this in any great detail, but I do want to suggest that teachers
 are not merely 'state functionaries' but do have some degree of autonomy, and that
 this autonomy will not necessarily be used to further the proclaimed ends of the
 state apparatus. Rather than those who work there fitting themselves to the
 requirements of the institutions, there are a number of very important ways in
 which the institution has to take account of the interests of the employees and
 fit itself to them. It is here, for instance, that we may begin to look for the
 sources of the alleged inertia of education systems and schools; that is to say
 that what appears as inertia is not some immutable characteristic of bureaucra-
 cies, but is due to various groups within them having more immediate interests
 than the pursuit of the organization's goals. (Dale, 1989, p. 57; emphasis
 added)
 That 'some' reference is required vis-a-vis the teaching profession evinces Dale's ontolog-
 ical equivocality about the relative causal efficacy of the profession qua corporate group
 vis-a-vis the polity and the basis for such efficacy. However, such equivocality is more
 apparent than real. The underlying prioritisation of the educational system(s) logically
 enjoins that Dale eschew any detailed analysis of the profession: he is not so readily
 inclined to put all his ontological cards on the table, so to speak. Yet his concession
 that teachers possess some autonomy immediately throws up the question of their
 degrees of freedom versus stringency of constraints; namely, that 'some autonomy'
 enjoins that capitalist needs cannot be deemed a priori of more importance. The very
 fact that teachers have interests begs the question of their structural provenance; here,
 Dale only accords the education system itself a pale materiality at best. He writes (see
 earlier) that any inertia is not due to the nature of the education system per se, but rather
 to the immediate vested interests of various groups. This elision of vested interest groups
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 and their structural embedding means that Dale would be unable to explain why
 concerted efforts by either the Government or teaching groups (or both) does not
 necessarily result in structural change because of the irreducible material properties of
 the system itself.
 The nature of assessment is useful in highlighting the materiality of the education
 system; namely, its independent properties vis-a-vis capitalist economic dynamics. For, as
 Broadfoot (1996) rightly points out, the education system is now inconceivable without
 some form of external assessment. Indeed, assessment has been central to the creation of
 education systems. Whatever the imperfections of past and current assessment proce-
 dures and their intended/unintended inegalitarian consequences, it remains that the
 assessment rationale is constitutive of educational systems, in turn conditioning what
 central government and teachers can do in them and/or about them. Dale (1989, p. 55)
 notes that the Government is unable to institute effective day-to-day control over every
 aspect of an apparatus's activities but does not adequately specify the ontological
 (transcendental) basis for this. I would want to add that this is the case for any
 government. That is, capitalist and non-capitalist polities alike confront similar systemic
 properties that condition their activities. Any educational system objectively provides
 teachers with vested interests in virtue of the irreducible materiality of the system and the
 associated division of knowledge and expertise. It is the latter expertise, inter alia, that
 needs theorising about in terms of the degrees of objective bargaining power that
 teachers bring to the negotiating table, and their subsequent negotiating strength that can
 then be analysed in conjunction with other factors. In other words, teachers' relative
 negotiating strength derives from the skills and knowledge afforded by the education
 system rather than simply from the social relations of production. Thus, I am not
 denying that capitalist societies condition activity in distinctive ways from their 'state
 socialist' counterparts. The point is that both have to contend with common features that
 are independent of their economic-systemic anchorage. Hence the recent adoption by
 some commentators of the metaphor 'steering at a distance' (for example, Ball, 1994),
 whereby the educational division of labour precludes untrammelled top-down central
 control.
 In a nutshell, the educational systemic division of labour and the associated division
 of knowledge and expertise do not comprise a pliable bundle with which any state
 (capitalist or otherwise) can do as it pleases. If the process of meeting capitalist needs
 were simply a one-way process of clarification and subsequent imposition, then one
 wonders why in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the development of the capitalist
 economy could be impeded by Anglican instruction, and that entrepreneurial groups
 were compelled to become 'self-taught scientists, to experiment with industrial applica-
 tions on a trial and error basis [and] to develop in-service training for mechanics,
 operators and accountants ...' (Archer, 1979, p. 113). Indeed, without a detailed
 examination of the organisation, values and related negotiating strength of the teaching
 profession, one would be unable to provide an adequate account of the genesis of the
 Plowden Report, namely how groups exploited anterior socio-cultural conditioning
 (Hadow Report, nature of the economy, etc.). Equally, the 1993 teacher boycott of tests
 cannot be explained away as some sort of capitalist hiccup. Yet, for Dale, in the final
 analysis, one must focus attention on the 'major motor of change' (the needs of the
 capitalist state). What he omits, of course, is that any state within an advanced economy
 will have needs that may not be met by the education system for the very reasons already
 discussed. The problem with the a priori importance accorded to the needs or functions
 of the capitalist state is that we miss many important things.
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 Rikowski: the denial of autonomy
 However, Whitty (1985) refers to Dale (1982), who wrote that we should be aware of
 trying to relate everything that goes on in schools back to the functions of the state on
 behalf of capital. In turn, one can argue that Dale does not allow a reduction of concrete
 social reality--specifically the autonomous properties of the education system-to that
 isolated in abstract thought, namely the capital relation. But for such Marxists as
 Rikowski (1996, 1997,1999) and Sharp (1986), the opposite maintains. We should thus
 not be surprised that Rikowski takes to task the so-called 'relative autonomy' Marxists
 such as Fritzell (1987). For, as Fritzell puts it, 'In the structural context, autonomy may
 be seen to refer to a type of relationship in which significant properties or internal
 relations of one system cannot be empirically derived from corresponding features within
 another system ...' (1987, p. 25). In other words, he is talking about ontological
 emergence and the irreducibility of social structure (see Archer, 1995; Reed, 1997;
 Willmott, 1999, 2000; forthcoming). The internal and necessary relation between
 lecturer and student is an irreducible emergent property since the powers of the
 individual qua individual are modified. Even though this emergent property depends for
 it existence upon continued state funding, the powers of the relation between lecturer
 and student are not reducible to the Department for Education and Employment and/or
 Local Education Authority qua structural entities. Following Gordon (1989), Rikowski
 believes he has defeated the 'relative autonomy' theorists when he comments that:
 Firstly, [Gordon] argues that it lacks meaning. How much strength are we to
 give to the notion of 'relative' in 'relative autonomy'? Just like the arguments
 about angels on pinheads, it implies that there is an answer to a question that
 defies answers ... Secondly, whilst she sees that relative autonomy theory is
 appealing for those who wish to escape vulgar Marxism ... [she] also notes the
 determinism lurking within it in its insistence on 'determination in the last
 instance' (of educational forms and practices by the economy) through the
 workings of the capitalist state ... Thirdly, Gordon notes that the work of
 Apple (1985) and other supporters of relative autonomy theory is schizoid as
 it tends to oscillate violently between an 'all-powerful' state as a juggernaut
 pushing through education measures of the New Right which are purportedly
 in the interests of capital, and the ability of students and teachers to 'resist' the
 seemingly irresistible through a variety of counter-hegemonic cultural forms
 and practices. (1997, p. 559)
 Rikowski argues that 'A dualistic structure-agency dilemma runs through the relative
 autonomy discourse which is indeterminate' (idem.). He concludes that Gordon's alterna-
 tive ends up as a variant along the same relative autonomy theme:
 She attempts to construct a theory of theory of the 'limits' and 'capacity' of the
 state and apply this to education. 'Limits' suggests that the state is unable to
 do certain things regarding education, thus it becomes 'relatively autonomous'
 once more and Gordon's critique falls back upon itself. (Rikowski, 1997, p.
 559)
 First, there is nothing dilemmatic about the structure/agency distinction, since it
 delineates two irreducible strata of social reality. Rikowski is correct to point out that
 simply to posit the (transcendental) reality of the autonomy of structural forms does not
 tell us the extent of such autonomy (or degree, as Dale rightly notes). What is sometimes
 missing from the equation, then, is a specification of the degrees of freedom versus
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 stringency of constraints. The 'schizoid' tendency of relative autonomy theorists as de-
 scribed by Gordon is precisely that specification; in this instance, recognition of the (now)
 substantially increased degrees of freedom at the state's disposal to impose policy
 underpinned by New Right philosophy. What needs to be emphasised here is that even the
 most stringent constraints do not determine agency in puppet-like fashion. Structural
 emergent properties have to be mediated by us. Thus agency can exit at any point in time,
 but to do so would be to incur a structured penalty (see Willmott, 1999; forthcoming).
 Second, we need to bear in mind that Rikowski (1996, 1997) wishes to 'dissolve' the
 structure/agency dualism, not because of the usual (although misplaced) assumption that
 the dualism is a Cartesian rather than analytical one [2] but, rather, it is because of the
 all-powerful omnipresence of the 'Capital Relation', whose immanent 'transcendence' is
 left to the sociological imagination. Indeed, while undoubtedly Rikowski would deny the
 charges of reification and determinism, we are left with a residual sense of agency
 responding to, rather shaping, the 'logical' outcome of the unfolding of the Capital
 Relation (Rikowski, 1997, 1999). However, he writes that, while the notion of the
 education system qua autonomous entity is the antidote for 'simple economic reduction-
 ism', he follows Sharp, arguing that we should not view the relations between capital, the
 state and education as a set of relations between institutions or systems-'Capital is a
 social relation' (Rikowski, 1997, p. 560). Indeed it is, but so too are the lecturer/student
 relation, headteacher/teacher relation, husband/wife relation, and so on. Rikowski, like
 Sharp, is making redundant any adequate sociology of education. We are denied the
 capacity to assess the extent to which policy can be imposed, how far policy intentions
 match their implementation. In fact, they are committing the fallacy that the material
 character of what is organised by the state has no effect. Ultimately, one would expect
 empirical reality to lead Rikowski to reassess his prior ontological commitments.
 However, his conflation of a multiplicity of sui generis strata consistently leads him to
 recommend the 'destruction of the project of "Marxist educational theory" in its entirety.
 Whoever treads this path ends up as a Labour-power Theorist rather than a Marxist
 Educational Theorist' (1997, p. 568). So, education is now out of the equation altogether.
 Yet, clearly, a focus on labour-power is somewhat unhelpfully narrow. But such is the
 logic of his approach, since '... a focus on the social production of labour-power
 necessitates a theoretical perspective where process and processes replace systems and
 institutions at the heart of analysis. The social production of labour-power cuts across
 and through institutions' (1997, pp. 568-569).
 Rikowski wants to expunge ontologically institutions and systems yet, naturally, cannot
 avoid using such terms. A focus on process and processes will not do. The processes
 involved in deciding whether to market a school aggressively take place within a
 'product', namely the school. The concept of school necessarily entails reference to sui
 generis social relations (paradigmatically the teacher/pupil social relation). However,
 Rikowski maintains that:
 Only a philosophy of internal relations allows us to think in these terms
 [process rather than product]. Flat, static thinking through such concepts as
 'institution' and 'system' makes analysis of the social production of labour-
 power as process and as trajectory impossible ... Through utilising a philoso-
 phy of internal relations following Ollman (1993), the attention shifts away
 from 'systems' and 'institutions' (the usual fare of much sociology of education
 and Marxist educational theory. (1997, p. 569)
 The next section critically dissects the Ollman social ontology of internal relations
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 adopted by Rikowski, extending its logic to argue that not only does it disavow a
 disaggregative analysis (Sayer, 1995), but also precludes any adequate explanatory
 methodology.
 Ollman, Internal Relations and the Omnipresent Capital Relation
 Class, Capital and the Division of Labour
 In the context of the division of labour in both capitalist and non-capitalist advanced
 economies, Sayer (1995) has convincingly argued that the generic flaw in Marxist analysis
 of capitalism is its inability to appreciate the materiality, complexity and intractability of
 an advanced division of labour, whose properties and powers are independent of the
 mode of production. I would argue that this applies equally to the recent treatment of
 the education system. As Sayer rightly points out, if we have too few abstractions over
 too narrow a range of angles, then material aspects of social reality are lost at a stroke.
 Possibly in Dale's case-and certainly in Rikowski's-we end up missing the materiality
 of the education system itself and the differing degrees of freedom it affords the teaching
 profession (or fragmented groups thereof).
 Whitty (1985) refers to the work of Holloway & Picciotto (1977) as illustrative of the
 limitations of neo-Marxist accounts of shifts in education policy. He notes that, for
 Holloway and Picciotto, like Rikowski and others, the central dynamic of the whole
 social formation is provided by the 'capital relation', which enters into all features of
 social life under capitalism. Although Whitty notes that Holloway and Picciotto intro-
 duced many caveats into their argument, in turn distinguishing it from a 'logic-of-capital'
 thesis, their approach still eluded an adequate understanding of the complex relative
 interplay of economic, political and ideological practice. While Whitty acknowledges the
 importance of economic needs on education policy, he does not elevate it to an
 ontological proposition that engulfs social reality in toto. On the contrary, what cannot be
 assumed is that economic pressures
 will always generate policy initiatives whose character can be derived directly
 from them, nor indeed is it necessarily the case that they will bring about
 outcomes that are incontrovertibly functional for capital. Much of the progress of
 the Great Debate in England has, for example, to be understood in terms of
 the peculiar political, professional and cultural character of the English educa-
 tional system and the existence within it of elements to which capitalism is
 'relatively indifferent' or 'had great difficulty in changing' ... (Whitty, 1985, p.
 85)
 Holloway and Picciotto's privileging of the 'capital relation' is not uncommon in current
 neo-Marxist theorising, both within and outside education sociology. The assumption is
 that the effects of capitalism's central processes are so far-reaching that everything in
 such a society is to some extent capitalist. Indeed, as sociologists, we are used to such
 terms as 'cultural capital', 'human capital', and so on. However, Hodgson (1999) argues
 that these are abuses of the word 'capital', which is properly confined to the notion of
 the money value of an owned stock of assets that exist in, or are readily convertible into,
 a monetary form.
 Outside slavery, therefore, there is no 'human capital' or 'social capital', as
 these are not stocks of assets that can be bought for money. At the most,
 outside slavery, human beings can be hired but not bought, but capital goods
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 can be both. It is not until one owns-rather than merely rents-the stock of
 assets that one becomes the owner of capital (Hodgson, 1999, p. 286)
 We should not be surprised that, for Rikowski, 'The class struggle, therefore, is not just
 'out there"-on picket lines, demonstrations and other forms of confrontation-but is
 everywhere, including within human-capital as life-form constituted by capital' (1999, pp.
 51-52). Yet, as Sayer (1995) argues, any advanced division of labour possesses an
 irreducible materiality that is more fundamental than particular modes of co-ordination,
 such as markets and planning. It is not only capitalism that generates macro-economic
 problems, but also market socialism. This should alert us to the fact that the social
 relations of production do not assume causal primacy or, indeed, constitute the key
 abstraction for Marxist theory, especially the sociology of education.
 In addition to our routine attachment to such over-extended concepts as 'cultural
 capital', there is a pervasive tendency both in Marxism and sociology in general to
 subsume the effects of division of labour under class. Put simply, class is conflated or
 confused with division of labour, thereby obscuring the different sources of power at
 different corporate groups' and individuals' disposal. The teaching profession's varying
 degrees of negotiating strength are not derivable from the social relations of production.
 Equally, technical divisions of labour objectively create scope for conflicts and inequali-
 ties within and between firms, and these objective power-bases can (and did) exist in state
 socialist society. The salient point here is that the materiality of an advanced division of
 labour greatly attenuates the causal primacy accorded to private ownership, inter alia,
 because of the considerable variety of power-bases it creates (which may or may not be
 strategically exploited) and the associated dispersal of knowledge. As Sayer (1995, p. 51)
 convincingly argues, such multiple sources of power cannot be subsumed under one
 single heading (i.e. class), yet this is precisely what much Marxism or 'class theory' tries
 to do. He suggests that those who resist the idea of treating professional employees and
 employee cleaners as in the same class probably do so because they cannot drop the
 habit of using an overburdened concept of class that attempts to cover all differences in
 power, income and life-chances. (This is one habit of which I am culpable.)
 Bertell Oilman and Universal Internal Relations: the repudiation of disaggregative analysis
 The common Marxist emphasis upon the totalising nature of the capital relation has its
 origins in the universal internal relations ontology, which can be traced back to the work
 of such prominent Marxist thinkers as Bertell Ollman and Marx himself. Rikowski's
 recent contributions (1996, 1997) attempt to supersede the historical problems that have
 bedevilled 'Marxist educational theory', such as the well-known 'correspondence theory'
 of Bowles and Gintis, and 'resistance theory'. However, while applauding his engagement
 with such past problematics, his unfinished programme is fatally flawed because of his
 adoption of the Ollman internal relations approach. One can glean Rikowski's pro-
 gramme from Ollman's account of his dialectical approach:
 My account of the dialectic stresses its roots in the philosophy of internal
 relations which holds that the irreducible unit of reality is the relation and not
 the thing. The relations that people ordinarily assume to exist between things are
 viewed here as existing within (as a necessary part of) each thing in turn, now
 conceived of as a Relation (likewise, the changes which any 'thing' undergoes).
 This peculiar notion of relation is the key to understanding the entire dialectic,
 and is used to unlock the otherwise mysterious notions of totality, abstraction,
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 identity, law and contradiction. In the interests of clarity, these notions are
 examined in Hegel as well as Marx and contrasted with their equivalents in
 Aristotelian logic and its watered-down version-common sense. (Ollman,
 1990, pp. 74-75)
 For Ollman, all 'Relations' are aspects of the whole. Crucially, he writes thus:
 The twin pillars of Marx's ontology are his conception of reality as a totality
 composed of internally related parts, and his conception of these parts as
 expandable relations, such that each one in its fullness can represent the
 totality. Few people would deny that everything in the world is related as
 causes, conditions or results; and many insist that the world is unintelligible
 except in terms of such relations. Marx goes a step further in conceptually
 interiorizing this interdependence within each thing, so that the conditions
 of its existence are taken to be part of what it is. Capital, for example, is not
 simply the physical means of production, but includes potentially the whole pattern of social
 relations which enables these means to function as they do. (1990, p. 100; emphasis
 added)
 Contrary to Ollman, commonsense would immediately question the bizarre notion that
 everything is part of an internally related whole-a totality. The totalising reductionism is
 transparent-capital is the whole pattern of social relations. Of course, there are causes,
 conditions and results in the world, but not all conditions are internally related. Water
 is composed of the internal and necessary relation between two molecules of hydrogen
 and one of oxygen. Yet water is not internally related to human beings (despite our
 asymmetrical internal dependence upon it). In other words, water provides one of the
 conditions for human existence, but water can exist without us yet we cannot exist
 without it. To be fair, however, for some objects, 'most famously capital itself, the
 internal-relations perspective is indeed illuminating, especially for making sense of Marx's
 own exposition of the properties of capital as it goes through different "moments" ...
 (Sayer, 1995, p. 27).
 But to extend the internal necessity that obtains between capital/labour as applying to
 all social relations and objects is, at best, an extremely unhelpful non-sequitur. At worst, it
 makes any form of critical social theory pointless. Yet if everything is internally related,
 how is it possible to step back? It seems logical to suggest that the internal relations
 ontology precludes critical standpoints. Nevertheless, Rikowski quotes Holloway, who
 maintains that 'If all aspects of society are to be understood as forms of social relations,
 then clearly they all form part of an internally-related whole ...' (Holloway, 1995, p. 166).
 Rikowski maintains, again following Holloway, that the state, money, capital and so on
 are 'apparently' separate: 'they are forms of social relations, the interconnections
 between which should be understood not as external (causal relations, for example), but as internal,
 as processes of transformation or metamorphosis' (ibid, p. 165; emphasis added). An
 unfortunate repudiation of explanatory power per se is the (heavy) price paid by adopting
 Ollman's internal-relations ontology. The complete lack of explanatory purchase on
 concrete educational systems and their interplay with the polity is readily gleaned from
 the withdrawal of causality to the state and capital respectively in the earlier reference
 to Holloway and Rikowski's own (unfinished) exposition of 'labour-power theory'.
 Surely, if they are interconnected, as Holloway maintains, then they must possess some
 modicum of autonomy in order to be so identified? And if they possess autonomy, then
 perforce they have properties independent of, and irreducible to, each other. But to
 recognise their irreducibility (which is not to deny any form of necessary interdepen-
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 dency) would be to accept that they have independent (autonomous) structural identities,
 which an internal-relations ontology precludes.
 An internal-relations ontology would disclaim the tenability of the asymmetrical
 relation between schools and their governing bodies. That is, a school can exist without
 a governing body, but not vice versa. Equally, the police can causally affect a school and
 vice versa, yet the relation is contingent (or external). Inconsistently, Rikowski (1996, p.
 445) approvingly quotes Hatcher, who rightly argues that it is possible to envisage gender
 equality in capitalist societies. This belies the internal-relations ontology, since gender is
 not ontologically dependent upon capitalism for its existence and vice versa. As Sayer
 puts it:
 The ontology of universal internal relations leads one to assume that objects or
 processes cannot be the same under different circumstances. It simply excludes
 the possibility [and empirical reality] that particular processes that exist in
 capitalism could also exist in a society with non-capitalist social relations of
 production, for it assumes that they must be different, and not just superficially
 but fundamentally (1995, p. 29).
 In fairness, Sayer points out that, with respect to the relationships between class, division
 of labour, money, commodities and property relations, Marx tended to assume ubiqui-
 tous internal relations in Hegelian fashion. Nevertheless, the denial of external social
 relations-or 'forms'-means that Ollman and others cannot conceive the asymmetrical
 internal relation between money and capitalism, namely that the former can exist
 without the latter but not vice versa. In fact, Sayer argues that it would be maintained that,
 if the social relations of production were different, then everything would be different (!).
 Yet, pace Sayer, the very identification of that which is different is impossible. The
 universal internal-relations ontology cannot explain (or identify) enduring causal entities
 at all, since any change enjoins that some form or entity possess causal powers proper
 to itself; that is, an independent sui generis identity in order for the identification of change
 to be possible. Transcendentally, therefore, the universal internal-relations ontology is
 false. How, indeed, could Marx identify the transition from feudalism to capitalism if the
 latter did not have an independent structural identity?
 The point of abstraction is to establish whether relations are internal or external. Thus,
 as Sayer points out, this allows for the possibility that features found within capitalism
 could exist outside it. The internal-relations ontology disallows a disaggregative ap-
 proach, whereby we can consider whether particular elements of political-economic
 systems can exist in combination with one set of other elements or whether they can also
 co-exist with other sets. Without a disaggregative approach that entails the posing of
 counterfactual questions, we would not be in a position to underscore the contingency
 of sexism and racism vis-a-vis capitalism and schooling itself.
 If x can exist without y, then it can obviously be considered separately from y,
 and doing so reduces the risk of misidentifying causal responsibility between
 them ... we could establish the asymmetric internal relation between capitalism
 and money ... Given Marxism's enormous emphasis on the social relations of
 production it is especially useful to consider how particular outcomes would
 differ were these to change. In some cases what is at issue is whether capitalist
 social relations are relevant at all ... For example, if not only capitalism but
 market socialism generate macro-economic problems ... then it is possible that
 their social relations of production are irrelevant ... (Sayer, 1995, pp. 31-32)
 In summary, the problem with the Marxist adoption of the internal-relations ontology is
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 that it results in a totalising discourse that absorbs non-capitalist phenomena or simply
 ignores them.
 The Absence of Feasible Alternatives
 Briefly, despite the transcendentally flawed nature of the universal internal-relations
 ontology of Ollman, we do not get even a hint of the sort of feasible alternatives implied
 by Marxist critiques in general. Rikowski is no exception here:
 The historical drive towards communist thought, practice, organisation and
 praxis is immanent within the unfolding of capital itself, and takes on increasing
 significance as human possession by capital deepens. The becoming of capital
 opens up possibilities for us to think communism and to put communist thought
 into action ... (1999, p. 53)
 Despite the generic evil of 'Capital', we are not provided with any feasible alternatives.
 Rikowski refers to Postone (1996) who, likewise, offers no discussion on feasible
 alternatives. There is much talk of emancipation in Postone's work (see also Ollman,
 1990), and, in particular, of the 'transcendence' of the mode of production. But what
 does this actually entail? As Sayer notes, life would be better if its illusions, conflicts and
 contradictions were reduced but the desirability of the latter does not make it feasible.
 The usual implicit assumption in radical political economy is that all bad things go
 together in capitalism and all good things under communism/socialism: 'Yet it is possible
 that some of the "contradictions" involve dilemmas which can't be eliminated along with
 capitalism. Evaluations in terms of desirability therefore need to be cross-checked with
 assessments of feasibility, and optimistic assumptions of inevitable improvement sus-
 pended' (1995, p. 34). Finally, the problem with a focus on the narrow abstraction of the
 'Capital Relation' is precisely its narrowness. It is worth quoting Sayer one last time:
 Evaluations of whole systems need to be exactly that, not judgements of the
 whole based upon just a part of that system. It is not enough, for example, to
 argue that if the capital-labour relation can be shown to be unjust, it therefore
 follows that capitalism must be overthrown ... Capitalism in the inclusive sense
 consists of more than the capital-labour relation ... It also has to be demon-
 strated that there is a superior alternative. All too often critical theorists ignore these
 points and judge and condemn whole (concrete) systems on the basis of abstract analysis of
 just one of their parts, while invoking an unspecified, imaginary society as automatically
 superior, (1995, p. 36; emphasis added)
 Concluding Remarks
 This paper has argued that the recent 'mini-renaissance' in 'Marxist educational theory'
 is flawed because of its adoption of the universal internal-relations social ontology. It
 results in a totalising discourse that misses many important aspects of concrete social
 reality, not least the education system itself. The 'mini-renaissance' must not only
 acknowledge the (transcendental) reality of contingency (or externality), but also incor-
 porate it robustly and consistently. At the same time, such recent Marxist theorising
 remains conspicuously silent on the feasibility of alternatives implied by its critique. It has
 been suggested that a disaggregative approach is required, in turn permitting the
 development of feasible (or realistic) alternatives: while we cannot predict the future, we
 are able to make judgements about what is feasible and desirable (Sayer, 1995).
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 NOTES
 [1] I hope to develop the arguments in this paper in the future, suggesting reasons as to why Marxist
 education theorists have tended to fall foul of the relative autonomy of the education system. This would
 involve a more explicit elucidation of the utility of critical realism vis-a-vis Marxism. At the same time,
 discussion of feasible alternatives would be undertaken.
 [2] Analytical dualism is grounded in a stratified social ontology and is held by critical realists such as Archer
 (1995), Willmott (1997, 1999, 2000) and Woods (2000) to be the methodological key to examining the
 relative interplay of structure and agency 'over time'. In contradistinction to Giddens' (1984) structuration
 theory, it is because structure and agency operate over different tracts of time that we are able to examine
 their interplay.
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